Over 2008 to 2012, the U.S. Border Patrol enacted new sanctions on migrants apprehended attempting to enter the U.S. illegally. Using administrative records on apprehensions of Mexican nationals that include fingerprint-based IDs and other details, we detect if an apprehended migrant is subject to penalties and if he is later re-apprehended. Exploiting plausibly random variation in the roll-out of sanctions, we estimate econometrically that exposure to penalties reduced the 18-month re-apprehension rate for males by 4.6 to 6.1 percentage points off of a baseline rate of 24.2%. These magnitudes imply that sanctions can account for 28 to 44 percent of the observed decline in recidivism in apprehensions. Further results suggest that the drop in recidivism was associated with a reduction in attempted illegal entry.
Introduction
Because administrative records on apprehensions have been unavailable previously, the literature lacks a longitudinal perspective on how Border Patrol sanctions affect migrant behavior. Our data now permit such an analysis. We face two empirical challenges. The first is that a migrant's characteristics may be correlated both with the sanctions he receives and his re-entry decision.
Exploiting the richness of the apprehension records, we control for interactions of migrant age, birthplace, previous apprehensions, and location and timing of capture. Identification is based on differences in recidivism among paired groups of migrants-one of which is sanctioned and one of which is not-in which the two groups share the same birthplace, birth cohort, and apprehension history, and were apprehended in the same location on the same day. Our identifying assumption is that during the CDS rollout, the assignment of penalties was as good as random, conditional on the controls. While implementing the CDS, individual Border Patrol sectors had discretion in delivering sanctions. 4 Capacity in sanctioning was affected by backlogs of migrants awaiting processing and available space in detention facilities (Capps et al., 2017) . We estimate treatment effects by exploiting high-frequency variation in capacity constraints.
The second empirical challenge is that, analogous to literature on criminality, 5 we do not observe recidivism in illicit activity (attempted entry) but rather in imprisonment (apprehension). Our estimated impact of the CDS on recidivism thus combines the impact on re-attempted illegal entry and the impact on the probability of capture, conditional on re-attempting entry. We exploit the structure of incentives to avoid capture to help resolve this ambiguity.
3 Other recent work examines the consequences of changes in immigration enforcement in the U.S. interior (e.g., Orrenius and Zavodny 2009; Bohn et al. 2014; Orrenius and Zavodny 2015; Hoekstra and Orozco-Aleman 2017) . 4 Along the Southwestern border, these sectors are: San Diego and El Centro (CA); Yuma and Tucson (AZ); and El Paso, Big Bend, Del Rio, Laredo, and the Rio Grande Valley (TX).
5 For recent work on recidivism in criminal arrests, see Bhuller et al. (2016) ; Heller et al. (2016) ; Agan and Makowsky (2018) . For a review of the previous literature, see Chalfin and McCrary (2017) .
Our results imply that the CDS can account for one-third of the reduction in re-apprehension rates between 2008 and 2012. Less-severe administrative sanctions have similar effects on recidivism to those of more-severe programmatic and criminal sanctions. Our results are unaffected by controlling for individual characteristics, as consistent with our identifying assumption that variation in the application of the treatment was due to Border Patrol capacity constraints and not to the identity of the migrant. The stability in our estimates, despite the large number of controls, suggests limited scope for selection-on-unobservables to explain our findings (Altonji et al., 2005; Oster, 2017) .
Data

CBP Administrative Data on Border Apprehensions
Our data cover all apprehensions of individuals attempting to enter the U.S. without authorization between ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border. After apprehension, the Border Patrol fingerprints migrants and takes their biographical information (GAO, 2017a) . Fingerprint records allow us to track individual migrants over time. Because Border Patrol policy shields women and minors from some sanctions, reserves voluntary return for Mexican nationals, and imposes severe sanctions on the few migrants with many previous apprehensions (GAO, 2017a), we restrict the sample to male Mexican nationals 16 to 50 years of age with six or fewer previous apprehensions.
We study 2008 to 2012, which spans the CDS rollout. Our sample contains 0.97 million apprehensions, which represent 79.5% of Mexican nationals apprehended at the border over 2008-2012. As seen in Appendix Table A1 , the Tucson sector of the Border Patrol accounts for 53% of sample apprehensions. When border enforcement intensified in the 1990s, many migrants switched from single-day crossings near major border cities to multi-day crossings in rugged eastern Arizona (Massey et al., 2016) , which lies within the Tucson sector. Nearly half of apprehensions occur during the first four months of the year, as migrants arrive for seasonal work in agriculture and construction, and seek to avoid extreme weather. Apprehensions are evenly distributed across days of the week and times of day, reflecting randomness in the timing of apprehensions that results from multi-day crossings. Whereas relatively few apprehended migrants are from Mexican states that border the U.S. (11.5%) or states in Mexico's far south (7.4%), the majority are from central Mexico (68.0%), consistent with historical patterns (Massey et al., 1994) . Re-apprehension rate (%)
Note: Data are from CBP administrative records showing the re-apprehension rates for the study population of male Mexican nationals 16 to 50 years of age with six or fewer previous apprehensions.
The Consequence Delivery System
A foreign national who enters the U.S. without authorization is in violation of U.S. law. The
Border Patrol may refer any apprehended migrant for criminal prosecution. For decades, however, standard practice regarding apprehended Mexican nationals was to offer voluntary return (Roberts et al., 2013) , under which a migrant forgoes the right to appear before a judge and agrees to depart the U.S. after transport to the border. He avoids formal removal and thereby escapes legal repercussions from his offense. Historically, the sheer volume of apprehensions, which averaged 1.2 million annually over 1999 to 2007 (DHS, 2008 , in part justified voluntary return. Another motivation was that during its early history, an implicit mandate of the Border Patrol was to help regulate the supply of low-skilled labor in the U.S. border region. Calavita (2010) and Roberts et al. (2013) Today, nearly all apprehended migrants are sanctioned under the CDS. Administrative consequences are delivered through a formal removal order (Rosenblum, 2013) . Migrants processed for removal are not detained. Instead, they are processed by Border Patrol agents and transferred to the border for release into Mexico. Processing a removal order requires 90 minutes of time, compared to 15 minutes for a voluntary return (Capps et al., 2017) . A removal order, which is tied to an individual's fingerprint record, precludes the migrant from applying for a legal entry visa for five years, and counts as a prior infraction when dealing with U.S. law-enforcement authorities in the future. For migrants already under a removal order (i.e., who have been subject to administrative consequences in the past), a subsequent apprehension may extend the time period during which they cannot obtain a legal entry visa to as long as 20 years. Because many undocumented immigrants from Mexico have an application pending for a U.S. green card, this penalty is onerous. In the New Immigrant Survey, Massey and Malone (2002) Programmatic consequences are used to disrupt smuggling networks. Given the high probability of apprehension for a Mexican national attempting illegal entry at the border (40-60% during our 7 As evidence of this history, the Border Patrol would frequently refer apprehended migrants to the Bracero Program (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) , through which the U.S. provided temporary work visas to farm workers. sample period), the large majority of migrants hire a smuggler. 8 The standard smuggling fee covers the cost of multiple attempts to cross the border, in the event that the first, second, or even third try ends in apprehension (Chávez, 2011) . For a given series of attempts to cross the border, migrants are thus tied to a particular smuggler (unless they choose to hire a new smuggler, which requires incurring the expense of a second fee). The main programmatic consequence is the Alien Transfer Exit Program (ATEP), under which an apprehended Mexican national, after being subject to other penalties, is repatriated to Mexico at a location far from his entry point, which complicates reconnecting with the smuggler he has hired. Angelucci (2015) finds that the decision to send a migrant to the U.S. among poor households in Mexico is strongly responsive to random shocks to household income, consistent with financial constraints limiting the ability of households to afford smuggling fees. The adverse shock of being subject to ATEP would limit the ability of Under criminal consequences, an apprehended migrant is subject to prosecution. Most occur 8 See Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2014), Massey et al. (2016) , DHS (2017) , and Roberts (2015; .
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under Operation Streamline, under which a migrant is tried for misdemeanor unlawful entry and appears with a group of migrants for sentencing. Although sentences may be up to 180 days for a first offense, first-time offenders are typically sentenced to time served (while awaiting a hearing).
If the migrant has many previous apprehensions or is suspected of non-immigration crimes, he may face Standard Prosecution in a U.S. federal district court, which involves sentences of up to two years and possibly being tried for a felony offense. 9 The imposition of criminal consequences was intended to signal the seriousness of the Border Patrol regarding border enforcement (Roberts et al., 2013 Figure 2 ). Operation Streamline accounted for 83.5% of these cases.
Administrative and criminal consequences, aside from their legal repercussions, may impose additional psychic costs on migrants. The sanctions communicate that border crossing is illegal, perhaps changing migrant perceptions of procedural justice surrounding border enforcement (e.g., Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2004) . Whereas the voluntary-return regime did not emphasize the criminality of illegal border crossing, the CDS regime does so strongly. Emphasizing the criminality of the act may have raised the disutility associated with being apprehended. 
Application and Rollout of the CDS
Historically, the Border Patrol was a decentralized organization, with sector chiefs having autonomy in setting enforcement strategy (Calavita, 2010) . The CDS originated in Border Patrol sectors whose leaders perceived that it might be effective in deterring illegal entry. It was not implemented across all sectors until late 2012 (Simanksi, 2013) . During the CDS rollout, variation in its application arose in part from sector-level differences in capacities for processing migrants. Applying sanctions is time intensive, and staffing levels were initially insufficient to impose penalties on all those apprehended.
Because some sanctions require assistance from other government entities, local resource availability in these entities also affected the delivery of penalties. We examine how these sources of variation in the application of the CDS-along with daily variation in the number of migrants attempting illegal entry-helped generate plausibly exogenous assignment of sanctions to apprehended migrants, conditional on their observable characteristics and the conditions of their apprehension.
Discretion in application of consequence programs. During the CDS rollout, decision rules for applying sanctions were based on (1) the origin country of the migrant, (2) the migrant's apprehension history, and (3) whether the migrant was traveling with family members (GAO, 2017a). The highest priority for sanctions was migrants from countries other than Mexico with many previous apprehensions (or a record of criminality). The lowest priority was Mexican nationals with no previous apprehensions, and the next lowest priority was Mexican nationals with a few previous apprehensions. Our sample migrants were therefore relatively low priority for sanctions and ones for whom the Border Patrol would have maximal discretion in assigning penalties. Capacity constraints in partner agencies. While the Border Patrol applies administrative consequences, it relies on other agencies to deliver programmatic and criminal consequences. Applying ATEP may require ICE buses and drivers. With criminal consequences, the Border Patrol requires the U.S. Marshal's Service to transport migrants to court, ICE to hold migrants in detention, the U.S. Attorney's Office to prosecute cases, and the U.S. federal judiciary to hear cases (GAO, 2017a).
Because these agencies face many demands on their resources, they may sometimes lack the capacity to address matters related to border apprehensions. In the early 2010s, federal courts requested that the Tucson sector, which first launched Streamline prosecutions, limit Streamline cases to approximately 70 per day (Capps et al., 2017) . Notes: Each row of these figures reports the R 2 from an OLS regression of a binary indicator for the given CDS sanction on the covariates listed in the row title. Each covariate is an exhaustive set of dummy variables for the given category; the ... indicate the addition of covariates in the given row to covariates in the prior row with the ultimate row including the full set of controls.
If variation in the application of the CDS was due more to prevailing conditions in a given Border Patrol sector than to migrant characteristics, these characteristics should play little role in determining whether a migrant received sanctions. Figure 4 reports R 2 from a linear probability model (LPM) regressing an indicator for whether an apprehended migrant is subject to sanctions on controls for the location and the time of the apprehension, the demographic characteristics of the migrant, and the migrant's previous apprehensions. In panel A of Figure 4 , the dependent variable indicates whether a migrant is subject to administrative consequences (AC). In row 1, we include only dummies for age, birth state, and previous apprehensions, which yields an R 2 of 0.055. 10 When we replace these dummies with indicators for the sector, year, month, day of week, and time of day of the apprehension in row 3, the R 2 jumps to 0.276. Adding back in dummies for 10 Gronau (1998) shows that the R 2 in an LPM equals the difference between the average predicted probability in the two groups (i.e., how much the covariates differentiate CDS sanctioned migrants from non-CDS sanctioned migrants) and clarifies why the R 2 in an LPM is less likely to approach 1 than in the case of a continuous outcome. 3 Empirical Specification
Regression framework
We evaluate how being subject to the CDS affects the likelihood that an apprehended migrant is re-apprehended in the future. Our specification is
where y ist+τ is an indicator for whether migrant i who is apprehended in Border Patrol sector s at time t is re-apprehended anywhere along the border within τ periods, for τ = 3, 6, 12, or 18 months; CDS ist is defined alternatively as an indicator for whether the migrant was subject to administrative consequences (AC) at apprehension, an indicator for whether the migrant was subject to any consequences at apprehension, or a vector that includes the AC indicator and an indicator for whether the migrant was subject to programmatic/criminal consequences (PC/CC) at apprehension; X it includes indicators for the migrant's age cohort at apprehension, birth state in Mexico, and number of previous apprehensions; α s indicates the Border Patrol sector of apprehension; α t describes the timing of apprehension (year, month, day of week, and time of day); f (·) characterizes the manner in which we interact the control variables; and ist is a disturbance term than captures unobserved variables that affect the likelihood of re-apprehension.
To control for variables that may be related both to whether the Border Patrol sanctions a migrant and to whether he re-attempts illegal entry, we define f (·) to generate interactions among X it , α s , and α t . We first interact only the sector, year, and month of apprehension, then add interactions for day of week and time of day of apprehension, and then add migrant characteristics. Under the most complete set of interactions, we allow sanctions to be correlated with shocks that affect the migrant's re-entry decision, as long as these can be modeled by sector×calendar-date×age×birth-state×previous-apprehension interactions. Our approach to identification would be invalid if there are additional characteristics of a migrant that affect his decision to re-attempt illegal entry and the decision of the Border Patrol to impose sanctions on him. Because agents decide whether to impose sanctions on a migrant in a matter of minutes, our assumption that, conditional on the controls, the assignment of consequences to a migrant was as good as random may not be unreasonable.
Comparing estimates of β across specifications reveals the sensitivity of the treatment effect to increasingly more-expansive controls for the characteristics of the migrant. We formally evaluate possible bias due to unobservables using the approach proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) and generalized by Oster (2017) .
Interpreting the CDS treatment effect
In (1), we estimate how the imposition of sanctions affects the probability that a migrant is reapprehended in the future. This probability can be written as
where P (R 1 ) is the probability that a migrant apprehended at t = 0 is re-apprehended at t = 1;
P (E 1 |C 0 ) is the probability that the migrant re-attempts illegal entry at t = 1, conditional on having been apprehended and having faced consequence C 0 = {0, 1} at t = 0, where 0 indicates no sanction and 1 indicates a sanction; and P (A 1 |C 0 , E 1 ) is the probability that the migrant is apprehended at t = 1, conditional on having been apprehended and faced consequence C 0 at t = 0 and on re-attempting illegal entry at t = 1. The treatment effect that we estimate in (1) iŝ
We (weakly) underestimate the impact of the CDS on the probability that a migrant re-attempts illegal entry if P (A 1 |1, E) ≥ P (A 1 |0, E 1 ). How would sanctions affect the incentive for a migrant to reduce his apprehension probability (e.g., by hiring a higher quality smuggler)? Consider two migrants who each have been apprehended once, where one was subject to sanctions and the other was not. Under administrative or criminal consequences, the sanctioned migrant has lost the ability to seek a legal entry visa for five years or more (and voided any visa application under review).
Because the risk of felony prosecution for a second apprehension is low, he may have less at stake in a subsequent crossing than the non-sanctioned migrant, who can still apply for a legal visa (or pursue a visa application under consideration). After a single apprehension, the sanctioned migrant may have a weaker incentive to reduce his probability of apprehension on a subsequent entry attempt, when compared to the non-sanctioned migrant, in which case P (A 1 |1, E) ≥ P (A 1 |0, E 1 ).
Accumulating apprehensions exposes a previously sanctioned migrant to risk of felony conviction.
Although standard prosecution is rare within our sample, applying to just 1.5% of apprehended migrants, a sanctioned migrant with multiple previous apprehensions may have a relatively strong incentive to avoid apprehension in a next crossing attempt, when compared to a non-sanctioned migrant with the same number of previous apprehensions. This discussion suggests that one way to gauge the sensitivity of our results to the confounding effects of changes in the apprehension probability is to allow the treatment effect to vary with the number of previous apprehensions.
Estimating the CDS treatment effect for migrants with a single previous apprehensions is where it seems most plausible that P (A 1 |1, E) ≥ P (A 1 |0, E 1 ) and that we weakly underestimate the impact of the CDS on the probability that a migrant re-attempts illegal entry. 11
4 Empirical Results The first treatment we consider is whether the migrant was subject to administrative consequences (AC) at apprehension, shown in panels A and B. In row 1, the control variables are complete interactions among dummy variables for the Border Patrol sector, the fiscal year, and the month in which the apprehension occurred. In row 2, we add interactions with indicators for the time 11 A factor affecting the ability of a migrant to finance multiple border-crossing attempts-and therefore also affecting the impact of the CDS on the apprehensions probability-is credit constraints (Angelucci, 2012) . If successive attempts to cross the border each end in apprehension, a migrant may be progressively less able to marshal the resources to pay smuggling fees on each subsequent crossing. Consistent with this reasoning, data from the EMIF-Norte (see note 6) reveal that the likelihood that a recently apprehended migrant used a coyote (smuggler) on his most recent crossing attempt is negatively correlated with the number of times he has been apprehended in the recent past (Roberts, 2015) .
Administrative Consequences
of day and day of week of the apprehension; in row 3, we add interactions with indicators for the migrant's age and birth state; and in row 4, we add interactions with indicators for the migrant's number of previous apprehensions. In row 5, we go further and introduce fixed effects for the sector and calendar date of the apprehension (e.g., January 12, 2010 in Tucson); and in row 6, we interact those dummy variables with migrant age, birth state, and number of previous apprehensions. The figures include point estimates and 95% confidence intervals. Tables A3 and A4 present the full regression output including sample size, which varies across specifications, as interactive fixed-effect cells without variation in sanctions across migrants are omitted. We cluster standard errors by the sector-year-month combination (270 clusters), to account for the common exposure of migrants to policies defined at the sector level at a given time. 12 Consider the estimate of the AC treatment on the 3-month re-apprehension rate in row 1 of panel A. The value of −0.064, which is very precisely estimated, indicates that migrants subject to administrative consequences were 6.4 p.p. less likely to be re-apprehended in the next 3 months (compared to a 2008 re-apprehension probability of 0.226). As we allow for more interactions between time and location of apprehension and migrant characteristics, there is essentially no change in the estimated treatment effect. In row 4, with the full set of controls, the estimate is −0.063.
The more-exhaustive sector-date fixed effects in rows 5 and 6 do not materially change this point estimate, which is −0.066 in row 6. Table A3 explores impacts on the likelihood of re-apprehension at longer time horizons, and again the estimated treatment effects are insensitive to expanding the set of controls. The treatment effect diminishes modestly as we expand the re-apprehension time horizon.
For results with exhaustive fixed effects in row 6 of Figure 5 (panels A and B), the AC treatment effect falls from −0.066 at 3 months to −0.046 at 18 months (2008 re-apprehension probability of 0.269). This attenuation could indicate that some of the sanction impact is psychological, where the trauma diminishes with time. Alternatively, it may take migrants time to build up the resources to undertake a second crossing, meaning impacts are lower at longer horizons.
Overall, the stability of coefficients across fixed-effect specifications provides prima facie evidence against a large role for selection on unobservables to explain our findings. Consider panel A, where the R 2 increases from 0.076 in row 5 with sector-date fixed effects to 0.409 in row 6 when adding Notes: Each row of these figures reports the point estimate and 95% confidence interval on the dummy variable for administrative consequences, in panels (A) and (B), or any consequences, in panels (C) and (D), in an OLS regression for re-apprehension within the next 3 months (panels A and C) or 18 months (panels B and D). Each row is a separate regression controlling for the fixed effects (FE) listed in the row title. These FE enter interactively where the ... indicate the addition of FE in the given row to FE in the prior rows. Standard errors are clustered by sector-fiscal year-month (270 clusters).
interactions with age, birth place, and number of previous apprehensions. 13 Despite this large increase in explanatory power, the treatment effect of AC sanctions remains effectively unchanged, going from -0.064 to -0.066. In other words, adding a large number of observable determinants of re-apprehension does not change the observed impact of AC. This pattern holds across our findings (see Table A3 ) and points to very limited selection on unobservables based on the Oster (2017) test. 14 The calculation here (comparing rows 5 and 6) suggests that selection on unobservables would have to be 482 times larger than selection on observables, which far exceeds the rule-ofthumb cutoff of 1 for observational studies. A similarly large Oster δ-statistic of 178.6 arises when comparing the specifications in rows 4 and 2. In short, selection on unobservables would have to be implausibly large to explain the effects on recidivism that we find.
Other Consequence Programs
In panels C and D of Figure 5 , we repeat the analysis in the upper two panels, redefining the treatment as an indicator for any consequence, including administrative (AC), programmatic (PC) or criminal consequences (CC). This broader definition of any CDS sanction implies a larger reduction in recidivism than the AC treatment alone. For the most demanding specification in row 6, the estimated effect of treatment increases from −0.064 for AC alone to −0.081 for any consequence (AC, PC, and/or CC) at the 3-month horizon and from −0.046 to −0.061 at the 18-month horizon.
Like the AC treatment effect, the any-consequence effect is stable across fixed-effect specifications.
Although the any-consequence treatment implies a larger reduction in recidivism, there is little difference in the effects of AC versus PC/CC. This can be seen in panel A of Table A5 , which shows that when entered as separate indicators, the AC and PC/CC treatments have statistically indistinguishable effects across most time horizons, with the distinct effects of each being slightly smaller than the any-consequence treatment. At the 3-month horizon, for example, the AC coefficient is −0.066, which we fail to reject being different from the PC/CC coefficient of −0.060 (p-value of 0.36). We find analogous patterns for the 18-month horizon (see panel A of Table A6 ).
13 This increase in R 2 is understated insomuch as the fixed effects fully absorb cells of observations within which there is a single migrant. These singleton cells do not contribute to the identifying variation in the point estimates, are omitted from the sample size in Table A3 , and thus do not add to the R 2 .
14 The Oster (2017) Given the uneven application of PC and CC across sectors and time (see Section 2.3), we exploit different sources of spatial and temporal identifying variation when comparing across consequences.
This prevents evaluating the conceptually ideal comparison across AC and PC/CC within-person.
These different sources of identifying variation may explain why the combined treatment effect of AC and PC/CC is less than two times the AC or the PC/CC treatment alone (see panel B of Tables   A5 and A6) . Alternatively, the positive interaction between the AC and PC/CC treatments may be evidence of diminishing returns to additional sanctions, such that the combined effects of the full set of sanctions is less than two times the effect of AC or PC/CC alone.
To gauge the economic significance of the estimates, consider the impact of the CDS on re- 
Recidivism in Apprehensions versus Recidivism in Attempted Illegal Entry
Following Section 3.2, we connect our results on recidivism in apprehensions to recidivism in attempted illegal entry by allowing the CDS treatment effect to vary with the migrant's number of previous apprehensions. A sanctioned migrant with a single previous apprehension may have a weaker incentive to avoid apprehension on a subsequent crossing than a non-sanctioned migrant with a single apprehension, in which case our estimated impact of sanctions on recidivism in apprehensions may weakly understate the impact of sanctions on recidivism in attempted illegal entry. Table A7 reports extended regression results for the row 4 specifications in Figure 5 . Panel A shows treatment effects for administrative consequences, and panel B does so for any consequences, where we allow these effects to vary according to whether a migrant has one, two, three, or four to six previous apprehensions. For re-apprehension within 18 months, shown in column 4, the estimated any-consequence treatment effect for migrants with a single previous apprehension (−0.056) is smaller in absolute value than that for migrants with two previous apprehensions (−0.075 = −0.056 − 0.019), where this difference is statistically significant. This pattern holds for both administrative consequences and PC/CC, and results are comparable at other time horizons for re-apprehension.
Taking the CDS treatment effect for migrants with a single previous apprehension as our most conservative estimate, we obtain magnitudes that are only slightly smaller than in Figure 5 . In going from the full sample to the single-apprehension sample, the reduction in re-apprehension rates induced by any consequences falls from −0.079 to −0.074, at the 3-month horizon, and from −0.059 to −0.056, at the 18-month horizon. These results suggest limited scope for the impact of sanctions on the probability of apprehension to confound our estimates, indicating that the CDS treatment effect on recidivism in apprehensions is informative about the (more-policy-relevant) CDS treatment effect on recidivism in attempted illegal entry.
Discussion
Undocumented immigration is a highly contentious issue in the U.S. Some critique the government's success in securing borders against illegal entry, while others object to the treatment of immigrants by authorities. Early research on border enforcement inspired pessimism about government efforts to deter undocumented immigration. As the number of Border Patrol agents grew in the 1990s and early 2000s, so too did illegal entry. Since the late 2000s, the Border Patrol has carried out another personnel buildup, while it has augmented its enforcement strategy by constructing additional physical barriers, deploying new detection technologies, and imposing tougher sanctions on apprehended migrants. Sanctions work by reducing the viability of legal immigration in the future and by raising the risk of incarceration. We find that sanctions have large negative impacts on recidivism in apprehensions and, plausibly, on recidivism in illegal entry. The crucial next step in designing viable immigration policies is to determine the relative cost effectiveness of alternative strategies for deterring illegal entry. Such analysis is not yet feasible but would be with expanded access to data on U.S. border enforcement efforts. Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (1) for the effect of administrative consequences on the probability of re-apprehension within 3, 6, 12, or 18 months after the initial apprehension. Coefficients and standard errors are shown in Figure 6 . Sample sizes decline with the inclusion of additional interactive fixed effects because we omit the singleton cells for which there is a single observation. Standard errors (clustered by sector-year-month) are in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at 10% *, 5% **, and 1% *** level for those standard errors. Within brackets, we report the p-values based on a wild bootstrap procedure clustering at the sector level (of which there are 9).
Note: This table reports estimates of equation (1) for the effect of administrative consequences on the probability of re-apprehension within 3, 6, 12, and 18 months after the initial apprehension. Coefficients and standard errors are those shown in Figure 5 . Sample sizes decline with the inclusion of additional interactive fixed effects because we omit the singleton cells for which there is one observation. Standard errors (clustered by sector-year-month) are in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at 10% *, 5% **, and 1% *** level for those standard errors. Within brackets, we report the p-values based on a wild bootstrap procedure clustering at the sector level (of which there are 9). Notes: This table replace administrative with any consequences (administrative, programmatic, or criminal) and re-estimates the same set of specifications as in Table A .XX. The coefficients and standard errors are the input to Figure XX . Stars indicate significance at 10% *, 5% **, and 1% *** level for those standard errors. Within brackets, we report the p-values based on a wild bootstrap procedure clustering at the sector level (of which there are 9).
Note: This table replaces administrative consequences with any consequences (administrative, programmatic, and (or) or criminal) and re-estimates the specifications in Table A3 . Coefficients and standard errors are those shown in Figure 5 . Standard errors (clustered by sector-year-month) are in parentheses. Stars indicate significance at 10% *, 5% **, and 1% *** level for those standard errors. Within brackets, we report the p-values based on a wild bootstrap procedure clustering at the sector level (of which there are 9). 
Panel (A)
Panel (B)
Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (1) for the probability of re-apprehension within 3 months after the initial apprehension, allowing administrative and other (programmatic/criminal) consequences to have different effects on recidivism. Panel A enters the two consequence treatments separately, and Panel B allows for their interaction. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-year-month level. Stars indicate significance at 10% *, 5% **, and 1% *** level. 
Note: This table reports estimates of equation (1) for the probability of re-apprehension within 18 months after the initial apprehension, allowing administrative and programmatic/criminal consequences to have different effects on recidivism in apprehensions. Panel A enters the two consequences separately; panel B allows for their interaction. Standard errors are clustered by sector-year-month. Stars indicate significance at 10% *, 5% **, and 1% *** level. 
